common confusion between two kinds of knowledge : on the one hand, purely descriptive knowledge; on the other hand, knowledge that is also a knowledge of causation and is therefore explanatory, and is better called understanding. The prevalence of this confusion, due largely to the pretence (maintained by a considerable number of men of science) that science should be content with purely descriptive knowledge, made necessary a discussion of causation, mechanistic and ideological, leading to the following five all-important conclusions :

(1) Causal explanation is the chief aim of science, and the forming and testing of causal hypotheses has always been and ever must be the life-breath of scientific research.

(2) So far as can hitherto be seen, causation is of two kinds, mechanistic and teleological; the former pervading the inorganic, the latter the organic, world.

(3) The conception of teleological causation is primary, and that of mechanical is derived from it; in the sense that we know the former from inside (as well as in its outward effects) and that we should never achieve the conception of causation (or of dynamic agency, power, force, energy) without experience of ourselves exerting such causal agency in the course of striving to achieve our desired goals.

(4) Our criterion of truth in every branch of science is and can only be the pragmatic criterion; namely—Does the proposition alleged to be true effectively guide us to our goals when we deal actively with the objects concerned ?

(5) Since it follows from (4) that purposive or teleo-

logical activity is the very foundation-stone of all science,
the only criterion of truth, it is not a little absurd for men
of science to manifest, as so many do, an extreme timidity